„Szerkesztő:Sierrahun/próbalap” változatai közötti eltérés
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'''G. Moxley Sorrel''', Lonstreet törzsfőnöke 61-től 64-ig, a postwar érában a Lost Cause retorika ellen volt és Longstreet védelmezője. 1905-ben posztumusz megjelent a Recollections of a Confederate Staff Officer, New York, Neal Publishing Co., 1905) a tollából. Burkoltan elismeri, hogy a "nem volt lovasságunk" retorika nem igaz: "There was a squadron or two, here and there, a regiment at one place, and a birgade under an efficient commander left in the rear. But these separate little commands amounted to nothing. It was the great body of that splendid horse under their leader Stuart that Lee wanted. He was the eyes and ears and strong right arm of the commander, and well may he have missed him." Lee tehát hiányolta és mikor megérkezett, félholt állapotú lovasság élén jött meg.
1908-ban '''Mosby''' is megjelentette a könyvét, Stuart's Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign. Az első rész a Brandy Station-i ütközetről szól, a második Stuart és Mosby apologetika. Lee trénjét az védte a legjobban, hogy Stuart az unió LOC-jét támadta és maga után húzta az üldöző szövetségi lovasságot. "Once benefit of Stuart's crossing at Seneca was that it practically eliminated French's corps in the campain, and put it on the degfensive, to guard the line of the Potomac and the rear of Meade's army". "It had been the garrison - 11000 - at Harper's Ferry, but when the place was abandoned, it was added to Meade's command. But Stuart's appearance created such a sensation that Meade sent 4000 to guard the canal, and 7000 were kept at Frederick. They were no more help to Meade in the battle than if they had stayed above the clouds on Maryland Heights." Mosby szerint ha felégetik a zsákmányolt szekereket, akkor június 30-án talán elérik Early-t - de akkor sem tudnak Lee-vel kapcsolatba lépni Yorkból, mivel ő ekkor 55 mérfölddel nyugatra, Chambersburgben volt. Ekkor Mosby szerint: "General Lee knew perfectly well ... the direction in which Meade was heading his army, and that his cavalry occupied Gettysburg. Stuart could have told him no more. The instructions did not require him to report to General Lee but to Ewell. All the critics overlook that fact. But I have shown that while Early and Ewell had no need of more cavalry, Stuart's presence at Carlisle on the night of July 1 defeated a combination by which a heavy force would have been thrown on Lee's flank and rear when he was in the agony of combat." Mosby kijelenti, hogy ha Lonstreet és Hill egy napot veszteg maradtak volna, akkor Stuart nem ütközik bele a miattuk meginduló Hooker csapatokba és előttük át tud kelni a Potomacen. ((abszurdum)) Továbbá: "On the morning of the 26th, Hooker's army moved across the front of Jones' and Robertson's brigades to the pontoon bridges - and they retired to the Gaps. It is literally true that General Lee heard nothing from Stuart about it, and he had no right to expect to hear from him". Mosby leszögezi, hogy Lee jelentése nem mondja, hogy Jones és Robertson futárai nem értesitették semmiről. ibid 192. o.
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