„Fogolydilemma” változatai közötti eltérés

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== A fogolydilemma előfordulása a való életben ==
Ezek a szokatlan példák, melyek rabokat, zsákok csereberéjét és hasonlókat tartalmaznak, mesterkéltnek tűnhetnek. Valójában az emberi kapcsolatokban és a természetben is sok példa fordul elő, ahol a kifizetési mátrix hasonló. Ezért a fogolydilemma a társadalmi tudományok, mint például a közgazdaságtan, a politika vagy a szociológia, valamint a biológiai tudományok, mint az etológia és az evolúciótudomány érdeklődési körébe tartozik. ManySok naturaltermészeti processesfolyamat haveabsztrakt beenmodellje abstractedolyan, intohogy modelsrésztvevő inegyedek whichvégtelenül livingismétlődő beingsfogolydilemma-játékokban arevesznek engagedrészt. inEz endlessa gamesszéles ofkörű prisoner'salkalmazhatóság dilemma.adja Thisa widefogolydilemma applicability of the PD gives thefontosságát. game<!-- its substantial importance. -->
 
===A politikában===
 
A politológiában például gyakran használják arra a fogolydilemmát, hogy bemutassák azt a problémát, mikor két állam fegyverkezési versenybe kezd. Mindketten két lehetőség közül választhatnak: vagy növelik a hadi költségvetést, vagy megyezést kötnek a fegyverzet csökkentéséről. Bármelyik államnak a fegyverkezés a nyereségesebb stratégia, bármit is tesz a másik; ezért mindketten a fegyverkezés mellett döntenek.
A paradoxon lényege az, hogy bár mindkét állam racionálisan jár el, az eredmény látszólag irracionális. Ezt az [[elrettentési elmélet]] <!-- [[deterrence theory]] --> következményének tekinthetjük.
 
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===A tudományban===
 
A környezettel foglalkozó tudományokban a fogolydilemma jelenléte nyilvánvaló az olyan válságok esetén, mint a [[klímaváltozás]]. Minden ország a stabil éghajlattal jár a legjobban, de az egyes országok gyakran vonakodnak csökkenteni a saját széndioxid-kibocsátásukat.
The immediate benefit to an individual country to maintain current behavior is perceived to be greater than the eventual benefit to all countries if behavior was changed, therefore explaining the current impasse concerning climate change.<ref>{{cite news |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |year=2007 |url=http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9867020 | title=Markets & Data |date=2007-09-27}}</ref>
 
In program management and technology development, the PD applies to the relationship between the customer and the developer. Capt Dan Ward, an officer in the US Air Force, examined ''The Program Manager's Dilemma'' in an article published in Defense AT&L, a defense technology journal.<ref>{{cite web |author=Ward, D. | year=2004 | url=http://www.dau.mil/pubs/dam/05_06_2004/war-mj04.pdf | title=The Program Manager's Dilemma The Program Manager's Dilemma | publisher=Defense AT&L, Defense Acquisition University Press}}</ref>
 
In [[addiction]] research/[[behavioral economics]], [[George Ainslie]] points out<ref>{{cite book |author=George Ainslie |title=Breakdown of Will |year=2001 |isbn=0-521-59694-7}}</ref> that addiction can be cast as an intertemporal PD problem between the present and future selves of the addict. In this case, ''defecting'' means ''relapsing'', and it easy to see that not defecting both today and in the future is by far the best outcome, and that defecting both today and in the future is the worst outcome. The case where one abstains today but relapses in the future is clearly a bad outcome—in some sense the discipline and self-sacrifice involved in abstaining today have been "wasted" because the future relapse means that the addict is right back where he started and will have to start over (which is quite demoralizing, and makes starting over more difficult). The final case, where one engages in the addictive behavior today while abstaining "tomorrow" will be familiar to anyone who has struggled with an addiction. The problem here is that (as in other PDs), there is an obvious benefit to defecting "today", but tomorrow one will face the same PD, and the same obvious benefit will be present then, ultimately leading to an endless string of defections.
 
===In social science===
 
In [[sociology]] or [[criminology]], the PD may be applied to an actual dilemma facing two inmates. The game theorist Marek Kaminski, a former political prisoner, analysed the factors contributing to payoffs in the game set up by a prosecutor for arrested defendants (see [[#References|references]] below). He concluded that while the PD is the ideal game of a prosecutor, numerous factors may strongly affect the payoffs and potentially change the properties of the game.
 
===Steroid use===
 
The prisoner's dilemma applies to the decision whether or not to use performance enhancing drugs in athletics. Given that the drugs have an approximately equal impact on each athlete, it is to all athletes' advantage that no athlete take the drugs (because of the side effects). However, if any one athlete takes the drugs, they will gain an advantage unless all the other athletes do the same. In that case, the advantage of taking the drugs is removed, but the disadvantages (side effects) remain.<ref>{{cite web |first=Bruce |last=Schneier |url=http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2006/08/71566 |title=Drugs: Sports' Prisoner's Dilemma |date=08.10.06 | publisher=Wired Magazine}}</ref>
 
===In economics===
 
Advertising is sometimes cited as a real life example of the prisoner’s dilemma. When [[cigarette advertising]] was legal in the United States, competing cigarette manufacturers had to decide how much money to spend on advertising. The effectiveness of Firm A’s advertising was partially determined by the advertising conducted by Firm B. Likewise, the profit derived from advertising for Firm B is affected by the advertising conducted by Firm A. If both Firm A and Firm B chose to advertise during a given period the advertising cancels out, receipts remain constant, and expenses increase due to the cost of advertising. Both firms would benefit from a reduction in advertising. However, should Firm B choose not to advertise, Firm A could benefit greatly by advertising. Nevertheless, the optimal amount of advertising by one firm depends on how much advertising the other undertakes. As the best strategy is dependent on what the other firm chooses there is no dominant strategy and this is not a prisoner's dilemma but rather is an example of a [[stag hunt]]. The outcome is similar, though, in that both firms would be better off were they to advertise less than in the equilibrium. Sometimes cooperative behaviors do emerge in business situations. For instance, cigarette manufacturers endorsed the creation of laws banning cigarette advertising, understanding that this would reduce costs and increase profits across the industry.<ref name="trust">This argument for the development of cooperation through trust is given in '' [[The Wisdom of Crowds]] '', where it is argued that long-distance [[capitalism]] was able to form around a nucleus of [[Religious Society of Friends|Quaker]]s, who always dealt honourably with their business partners. (Rather than defecting and reneging on promises&nbsp;— a phenomenon that had discouraged earlier long-term unenforceable overseas contracts). It is argued that dealings with reliable merchants allowed the [[meme]] for cooperation to spread to other traders, who spread it further until a high degree of cooperation became a profitable strategy in general [[commerce]]</ref> This analysis is likely to be pertinent in many other business situations involving advertising.
 
Without enforceable agreements, members of a [[cartel]] are also involved in a (multi-player) prisoners' dilemma.<ref name=NicholsonIntermediateMicroEd8>{{Cite document|last1=Nicholson|first=Walter|authorlink=Walter Nicholson|year=2000|title=Intermediate Microeconomics|edition=8th|publisher=Harcourt}}</ref> 'Cooperating' typically means keeping prices at a pre-agreed minimum level. 'Defecting' means selling under this minimum level, instantly stealing business (and profits) from other cartel members. [[Anti-trust]] authorities want potential cartel members to mutually defect, ensuring the lowest possible prices for [[consumers]].
 
===In law===
 
The theoretical conclusion of PD is one reason why, in many countries, [[plea bargain]]ing is forbidden. Often, precisely the PD scenario applies: it is in the interest of both suspects to confess and testify against the other prisoner/suspect, even if each is innocent of the alleged crime. Arguably, the worst case is when only one party is guilty&nbsp;— here, the innocent one is unlikely to confess, while the guilty one is likely to confess and testify against the innocent.
 
===Multiplayer dilemmas===
 
Many real-life dilemmas involve multiple players. Although metaphorical, [[Garrett Hardin|Hardin's]] [[tragedy of the commons]] may be viewed as an example of a multi-player generalization of the PD: Each villager makes a choice for personal gain or restraint. The collective reward for unanimous (or even frequent) defection is very low payoffs (representing the destruction of the "commons"). Such multi-player PDs are not formal as they can always be decomposed into a set of classical two-player games. The commons are not always exploited: [[William Poundstone]], in a book about the prisoner's dilemma (see References below), describes a situation in New Zealand where newspaper boxes are left unlocked. It is possible for people to [[Excludability|take a paper without paying]] (''defecting'') but very few do, feeling that if they do not pay then neither will others, destroying the system.
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