Vita:Afrika az első világháborúban
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Ez a szócikk témája miatt a Hadtudományi műhely érdeklődési körébe tartozik. Bátran kapcsolódj be a szerkesztésébe! | ||
| Jól használható | Ez a szócikk jól használható besorolást kapott a kidolgozottsági skálán. | ||
| Nagyon fontos | Ez a szócikk nagyon fontos besorolást kapott a műhely fontossági skáláján. | ||
| Értékelő szerkesztő: Szajci (vita), értékelés dátuma: 2009. november 19. | |||
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Ez a szócikk témája miatt az Első világháború műhely érdeklődési körébe tartozik. Bátran kapcsolódj be a szerkesztésébe! | ||||
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| Értékelő szerkesztő: Szajci (vita), értékelés dátuma: 2009. november 19. | |||||
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Kép figyelmeztetés szerkesztés
A következő képeket törölték vagy törlésre jelölték a Commons-on. Mielőtt eltávolítod a képet a szócikkből ellenőrizd a Commonsbeli lapját a képnek, hátha időközben visszavonták, vagy hibát követtek el a törlésre jelöléssel. A kivett képet próbáld meg helyettesíteni egy másikkal.
Miután megoldottad a problémát, kérlek azt jelezd itt az üzenetet létrehozó sablon „|status=” sorában.
Ezt az üzenetet a CommonsTicker írta.
- Siebrand törölte a(z) Image:Battle_of_tanga.JPG nevű képet: dupe Image:Battle of tanga.jpg;
-- CommonsTicker 2007. május 8., 16:15 (CEST)
Rengeteg a helyesírási hiba.
Azon pedig nem tudom, hogy sírjak vagy nevessek, hogy a veszteségek ötnegyede indiai volt.
Források szerkesztés
Sandfonteini harcok innen: http://www.imperial-research.net/sandfontein.htm
DSWA harcok innen: http://www.greatwardifferent.com/Great_War/SW_Afrika/Botha_02.htm
DSWA harcok kronológiája innen: http://www.klausdierks.com/Chronology/72.htm
és innen: http://www.klausdierks.com/Chronology/73.htm
A Maritz-lázadásról innen: http://www.greatwardifferent.com/Great_War/SW_Afrika/Botha_01.htm
és innen: http://www.archive.org/stream/reportonoutbreak00foucrich/reportonoutbreak00foucrich_djvu.txt
meg innen: http://www.thuto.org/ubh/etext/nlisa/nl23.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maritz_Rebellion
http://samilitaryhistory.org/vol132hp.html
A Maritz-lázadást megelőző dél-afrikai belpolitikai állapotokról: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jan_Smuts_and_the_Old_Boers
Kameruni harcok: http://www.archive.org/stream/battlesketches1900hilduoft/battlesketches1900hilduoft_djvu.txt
Tangai ütközet: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Tanga,
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schlacht_bei_Tanga
Bővebben Német Kelet-Afrikai harcokról: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East_African_Campaign_(World_War_I)
http://samilitaryhistory.org/vol071sb.html
Még bővebben az egész afrikai hadszíntérről: http://www.1911encyclopedia.org/East_Africa:_Military_Operations
Külön cikkek? szerkesztés
Bocs, hogy nem a lap aljára írok, de akkor mindenkinek sokat kellene tekernie. Szóval szerintem olyan hosszan van itt szó a kameruni és kelet-afrikai hadműveletekről, hogy ezek simán lehetnének teljesen önálló cikkek... Talán úgy jobban kezelhető lenne a téma. – FREEWALES vita 2020. november 4., 16:11 (CET)
Azt tudnám mondani, mint Leslie Nielsen az Airplane-ben: bízunk magukban!. :) Sierrahun vita 2020. november 9., 11:47 (CET)
Fordítanivaló szerkesztés
http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=65037&st=75 Alexander von Hammerstein - died at Jassin
"The Meinertzhagen Mystery - the life & legend of a colossal fraud" by Brian Garfield, Potomac Books, is available through Amazon. It doesn't cover Bukoba but dissects Tanga & other BEA activities.)
On 9 September 1914 a German force supported by the "Muansa" landed at Karungu, moved inland to join another German force crossing the Mara River, & occupied Kisii. The British police post at Kisii withdrew towards Kendu. The German troops were tasked with demolishing viaducts on the Uganda Railway.
Tanga: The 2nd Kashmir Rifles, the half Bn of 3rd Kashmir Rifles & the half Bn of 3rd Gwalior Rifles had come ahore on "B" Beach. The two half Bns were formed into a Composite Bn but three Gwalior Rifles companies were detached for beach security duties.
The only field engineers in the Force, the Faridkot Sappers & Miners, were not disembarked & so they stayed out of the battle along with their engineer resources.
A North-Western Railway Volunteers gun detachment destined for armoured train duties also appears to have been left out of the fighting.
Machine Guns were to decide the outcome of this day's battle. The British scale of Machine Guns was two per Bn, but only the 2nd Loyal North Lancashires, the 101st Grenadiers & the 61st King George's Own Pioneers had possessed Machine Guns before the war started.
The 13th Rajputs & the 98th Infantry were hastily issued with guns before embarking in India, & the 63rd Palamcottah Light Infantry only received guns after it had embarked. These three units landed at Tanga with inadequately trained & inexperienced Machine Gun teams. The Imperial Service units, provided & financed by princely states, did not possess Machine Guns.
As the 61st Pioneers were in the rear as reserve troops, only the Loyal North Lancashires & the 101st Grenadiers were moving forward with well-trained gun teams - a total of 4 guns to face the strongly positioned & experienced Schutztruppe teams who had 15 guns in action. The six gun teams from the Rajputs, Palamcottahs & 98th were going to have to learn battle-handling skills "on the job" - if the Germans allowed them to.
Another handicap was that most Indian riflemen in the Force had been using the obsolete long MLE Rifle but just before embarkation they were issued with short Lee-Enfields. Thus they landed at Tanga with an unfamiliar weapon in their hands. The Schutztruppe were mostly using older black-powder weapons, but they were familiar & proficient with them.
Whilst the Schutztruppe fortified the Railway Compound & Tanga town, IEF "B" concentrated on organisation & administration behind the defended line on Ras Kasone dug by the Loyal North Lancashires.
On the night of 02 November The Patrol Company & the 13th Rajputs had patrolled forward, the latter locating two enemy Machine Guns on the railway cutting (the patrol report was dismissed by Brigade HQ), but there are no details of British patrols out on the night of 03 November. (Some responsibility for this must lie with the supreme critic of the battle Captain Richard Meinertzhagen. As the Force Staff Officer Grade 3 (Intelligence) he was the man to task & co-ordinate a Force Patrol Programme. But he didn't.) The Germans were patrolling though & bumped a Loyal North Lancashire position south of "A" Beach.
The British command ensured that the troops had a hot meal & then organised the attack using the only tactics they knew, simple drills based on experiences in the South African & North West Frontier wars, 15 years or more before.
An assault line was formed with the Kashmiris on the right with the harbour on their right & the Rajputs behind them. Next came the Loyal North Lancashires with the 63rd Palamcottahs to their left & then the 101st Grenadiers on the left flank, echeloned back to protect the left flank. The 98th Infantry were behind the Loyal North Lancs. The 61st Pioneers were the Force reserve & positioned on the right rear.
The British deployed over 5,000 men against the German force of just over 900 men, but those figures are misleading. The number of men in action was not as significant as the amount of firepower effectively used. Colonial buildings in Tanga. The Schutztruppe barricaded windows, doors & stairways, covering each fortified location with fire from other defended locations.
The Loyal North Lancashires had first been stung by bees the previous day when digging-in, as rubber trees cut down by another unit brought down hives that local African farmers had placed up in tree branches. Now throughout 04 November 1914 the whole of IEF "B" & the Schutztruppe were constantly at risk from bee stings as bullets whipped through the trees, disturbing more hives. (An operator from the Indian Telegraph Department, Sub-Conductor W. Preston, was awarded the DCM for gallant conduct at Tanga. He continued to work his field telegraph whilst being attacked by a swarm of bees. Later over 400 stings were removed from his head.)
As the assault line formed up the unit on the left of the Loyal North Lancs was in a bad way. The 63rd Palamcottah Light Infantry had embarked in India on 30 September, remained on board in extremely cramped conditions below decks for 16 days before sailing, & had just disembarked that morning after standing-to on deck all night. When warned-off for East Africa nearly half (6 of the 13 on strength) of the British officers in the unit became unavailable. Six new officers were posted in from elsewhere, two joining on the day of embarkation, & none of these new officers did any training with the Bn. To make the Palamcottahs up to strength a large draft from the 83rd Wallajahbad Light Infantry had just been posted in. The issue of Machine Guns only after embarkation has been commented on. This Bn needed recuperation & training, instead it found itself in the assault line of an attack on a strongly defended position, with the minus factor being that there was no effective artillery support. At noon the British assault line fixed bayonets & moved forward in the extreme heat of the day.
The Loyal North Lancs had two double-companies forward & two double-companies in rear. Bn HQ & the two Machine Guns were in the centre.
Initially the going was through dense rubber plantations & soon open-order was the only practical formation as men ducked around trees.
The Palamcottahs on the left soon became exhausted & fell behind. As gaps opened with the Kashmiris on the right the right rear Loyal North Lancs double-company was moved forward into the line.
The opening shots in the battle were fired in the harbour. Some members of the crew of SS "Assouan" (which had transported the 63rd Palamcottahs) used their initiative & brought a boat into Tanga jetty to buy fresh rations. German sentries promptly shot several of them & the survivors returned hastily to their ship, the boat being towed by three men swimming.
The Kashmiris on the right then encountered enemy patrols & drove them back towards the railway cutting.
The Loyal North Lancs moved out of plantations into an area of high maize fields & native huts where Askari from 6 Feldkompagnie engaged them. The Bn also came under fire from the Railway Station, & on the left heavy firing signalled that the 101st Grenadiers were hotly engaged. The two Loyal North Lancs Machine Guns were brought into action & the Bn fought forward to the railway cutting ahead.
By now the 63rd Palamcottah Light Infantry had had enough & retired, seriously disturbing the morale of the 98th Infantry as they retreated past that Bn.
The 101st Grenadiers were now left isolated without support on either flank, but they stood their ground & courageous men tried to charge down the Schutztruppe Machine Guns that were taking a steady toll of the Bn.
The railway cutting east of Tanga town.
As the 2nd Loyal North Lancashires fought towards the railway cutting fire was coming from all directions, including wild firing from other British units on both flanks & in the rear.
Now bees swarmed against the Bn again, stinging men ferociously.
The Bn's Machine Guns were effectively handled against the Schutztruppe guns opposing them, but one Loyal North Lancs gun had to be temporarily abandoned as the crew was incapacitated by bee stings. Footbridge over the railway cutting east of Tanga looking west.
In 1914 three footbridges crossed the railway cutting, & this one remains today. 6 Feldkompagnie were covering these bridges from the west.
The Loyal North Lancashires maintained momentum & parts of all three forward double-companies fought across the railway cutting.
To the north the Kashmiris also fought across the railway cutting & entered the town. Area just west of the railway cutting, Tanga. In 1914 this was open ground.
The bulk of the three forward Loyal North Lancs double-companies crossed the open ground west of the railway cutting & started street & house to house fighting in the town.
Bn HQ & the two Machine Guns appear to have remained on the east side of the cutting.
The one reserve Loyal North Lancs double-company now crossed the cutting & attracted concentrated fire from the Railway Compound, which pinned it down in the area of this image before it could enter town.
Not all the Palamcottahs disintegrated. Their two Machine Gun teams, directed by officers, fought to the best of their ability. A British & Indian officer of the 83rd Wallahabad Light Infantry (drafted into the Palamcottahs) got 25 men up to the railway cutting but their men were shot or fell away. The officers crossed the cutting but withdrew for lack of support, the Indian officer being shot in the cutting on the withdrawal. On the British right the Imperial Service Brigade was going well & showing that well-selected & trained Indian troops were a match for the Schutztruppe.
The Kashmiris bayonet-charged into town & captured a Machine Gun.After fierce bayonet fighting Rajputs & Kashmiris captured the Kaiser Hotel & removed the German flags flying above the roof. In the town Loyal North Lancashire Company Commanders re-grouped their men but the nature of the street fighting meant that Platoon Commanders were tasking their sections onto buildings & streets to their immediate front, & fighting their own intensive fights.
In this street fighting British training, tactics & rifles had the edge.
At one stage an intrepid German motorcyclist (probably from a Schutzenkompagnien) rode towards a Loyal North Lancashire group, stopped his machine, & opened fire at close range with a Maxim mounted on the cycle. He was despatched with rifle fire. Privates Coulson (H Coy) & Ainsworth & Ward (both F Coy) captured a German prisoner. (What hapened to him is not known. Meinertzhagen's diary complains that no prisoners were captured.)
However things were not getting easier for the Loyal North Lancashires. Casualties were mounting & both casevac & ammunition replenishment were blocked by the continuing domination of the railway cutting by German machine guns.
Lt. S.V.E. Hickson was hit in the arm, pulled under cover by Private Smith, a stretcher bearer, but the "cover" was enfiladed & both men were shot, Lt. Hickson in the chest fatally.
Then Tom Prince put 7 & 8 Schutzenkompagnien into a counter-attack from the west of town. The Loyal North Lancashires, Kashmiris & Rajputs in the town had to defend the ground they had gained.
The Loyal North Lancashire War Diary states: "It was at this period that co-operation of gun fire from the "Fox" or from other guns would have been invaluable, but no help was given until late in the afternoon." On the British left the situation was deteriorating.
The 98th Infantry, the reserve Bn of 27 Brigade, was suddenly attacked by bees & the men dispersed rapidly. Although slowly reformed the 98th then lost interest in the battle. (The Loyal North Lancs War Diary describes the few 98th infantrymen seen to the right rear: "These men lay down & appeared to take no further part in the fight.")
More seriously the 101st Grenadiers, fighting furiously on the left flank, were now totally isolated. When the 63rd Palamcottah Light Infantry, wedged inbetween the Grenadiers to their left & the Loyal North Lancs to their right, broke & headed for the beach, the Grenadiers then had no right flank protection. The Grenadiers became even more isolated as the Loyal North Lancs ran across the railway cutting & entered town.
As German reinforcements arrived in Tanga 16 Feldkompagnie had dug-in northeast of the railway station in the area of where the above image was taken.
Observing the plight of the 101st Grenadiers, 27 Brigade Commander General Wapshare ordered the Bn to incline right. As the Grenadiers did so they entered the killing ground of 16 Feldkompagnie & suffered severely.
The British situation was still not desperate, & could have been retrieved with salvos of well-directed 6-inch gunfire from HMS "Fox" & by the fire of the 28th Mountain Battery. However neither HMS "Fox" nor the Battery had put fire controllers & signals equipment ashore. (OC 28 Battery did try to use the mast-head of the "Bharata" as an Observation Post, but he still could not see his fall of shot.)
Lettow sensed that his moment was arriving. Forming Up Place for German counter-attacks, looking in the direction of attack. A location in the high-density housing area of Tanga.
Lettow moved 1 & 17 Feldkompagnies east of the railway station. This brought four new Machine Guns to bear on the 101st Grenadiers.
13 Feldkompagnie were formed up in the area of the above image for a counter-attack.
By now the Grenadiers' leading companies had lost half their men & all their British officers.
The Grenadiers' two Machine Guns, assisted by the Palamcottah's guns which were still in action, took on the German guns from the southern flank, but by now the 101st had fought itself into the ground & was losing cohesion. Old building in Tanga.
In Tanga town Tom von Prince (awarded the "von" for many acts of gallantry in colonial fighting in GEA) was down, killed in action leading his Schutzenkompagnien. Tom had been very influential in the formation of Shooting Clubs for German settlers in GEA. These clubs now provided Lettow with a large number of trained leaders for the Schutztruppe.
But increasing pressure was being applied onto the British troops in the town, & no support of any kind was provided.
Some junior staff officers were in town but command elements stayed east of the railway cutting.
As the Loyal North Lancashires heard the increased amount of firepower being used against the 101st Grenadiers they realised that soon they may be trapped in the town. Courtesy of the US Army Command & General Staff College
(These maps, generously placed by the US Army Command & General Staff College on the internet, are representational of events but not totally accurate. The compiler has accepted Meinertzhagen as a reliable source for details of unit movements & dispositions, & this has resulted in innacuracies when other sources such as War Diaries, histories & personal notes are compared.)
The German counter-attacks on 04 November 1914.
The fresh troops of 13 Feldkompagnie were launched into a counter-attack on the 101st Grenadiers' southern flank.
The Grenadiers, still totally alone & now reeling, were driven back, crumbling into small groups.
As Lettow records: "... & no witness will forget the moment when the machine guns of the 13th Company opened a continuous fire at this point & completely reversed the situation. The whole front jumped up & dashed forward with enthusiastic cheers."
This was extremely bad news for the British troops in Tanga town. The 101st Grenadiers had nearly one quarter of their strength killed in action. General Aitken had now lost whatever initiative he might have thought he had. He authorised HMS "Fox" to open fire on the town with her 6-inch & 4.7-inch guns.
Apart from hitting the German Hospital one of Fox's blindly-fired shots hit a house in town being defended by the Kashmiris. The German troops in town pulled back to the west & avoided this random gunfire but returned into action as soon as Fox ceased firing.
The Loyal North Lancashires could hear the sound of new German Machine Guns coming into the fight behind them as Lettow deployed his reinforcements to the southeast.
Loyal North Lancashire troops were now intermingled with Kasmiris & Rajputs, & many unrecorded acts of gallantry occurred as wounded men were recovered.
The Company Commanders were in a dilemma as Bn HQ was on the east of the railway cutting & could provide no direction or new orders. Signal cable does not appear to have been laid into town, understandably considering the vulnerability of that task. Runners attempting to cross the cutting attracted heavy fire.
The Company Commanders had a quick conference & decided to withdraw across the railway cutting whilst they could. A stand was made at the edge of the town whilst all the British troops were organised & briefed, then a rapid withdrawal was made across the belt of open ground towards the railway cutting.
Now, because of the lack of any kind of directed naval gunfire or artillery support, the Loyal North Lancashires suffered their heaviest casualties of the day.Tanga railway cutting looking south.
The cutting is steep-sided & deep. German Machine Gunners had ranged upon the footbridges & the water steps down the sides.
As officers tried to organise a fighting withdrawal they were shot down. Major Francis Braithwaite, OC No 4 Coy (see Post #41) was killed & Captain Eric Halton, OC No 3 Company was wounded. Lt G.G.R. Williams was shot in the head & left for dead (he slowly recovered in a German PW Camp).
Many Loyal North Lancashires were killed in this stretch of the cutting & on the open ground either side of it.
The wounded had little chance of getting across this obstacle. Footbridge across the railway cutting at the scene of the Loyal North Lancashires' withdrawal, looking east.
As the Kasmiris withdrew into the cutting, which they then defended at the northern end, Major Ames, their senior British officer, was wounded & rendered unconscious.
However bees then attacked the Kashmiris & Major Ames was stung back to consciousness.
(The Kashmiris had been attacked by bees so many times that they had become adept at using their head-dress to mask their face & neck.)
A boat from the SS "Bharata" picked up Major Ames, & it was the return of this boat that gave the Artillery & the "Fox" their first news about events in town.
One of the two Loyal North Lancashires' Machine Guns was out of action with broken locks, but the remaining gun gave what cover it could to its Companies crossing the cutting to the south, whilst the two Rajputs' Machine Guns held a road bridge across the cutting in the defensive line to the north.
Private M. Lawlor, Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, was later awarded a DCM for gallantry displayed whilst repairing Machine Gun locks whilst under heavy fire from various directions.The wall panel in the British & Indian Memorial Cemetery, Tanga for the 2nd Kashmir Rifles (Bodyguard Regiment) & the 3rd Kashmir Rifles (Raghunath Regiment).
These units, being Imperial Service troops provided by the Ruler of Kashmir, had no Machine Guns.
Despite being in the thick of the fighting in Tanga town, & being shelled by HMS "Fox", the fighting skills of these mainly Gurkha & Dogra troops ensured that they suffered limited casualties. The second wall panel commemorating the dead of the 13th Rajputs (The Shekhawati Regiment). (The first panel was shown in post #248.)
This Bn was one of only two in the British Force that fought on 03 November as well as on 04 November.
Unfortunately on 03 November the CO & Adjutant were brought down by enemy Machine Gun fire, unsettling the troops.
The Bn had mixed fortunes but some companies fought well in Tanga town on 04 November, showing that with good leadership & sound, simple direction Indian Army soldiers could hold their own against Feldkompagnies. The drainage ditch towards its northern end.
The 61st King George's Own Pioneers were the Force Reserve. About half of the unit had been involved in the fighting on 03 November, losing four officers & 57 Pioneers killed in action.
As the Assault Line advanced on 04 November 1914 the 61st Pioneers also advanced on the right rear of the British Force, where they had been placed.
(The bulk of this unit, as far as I can tell, did not "disperse or crowd back to the beaches" as some historians have inferred, but stood its ground in good order as directed.)
By now the 61st Pioneers was on the line of the drainage ditch at the northern end, shown in the above image.
Interestingly the Loyal North Lancashires' War Diary comments that during the initial advance enemy Maxims had been passed over by the assault line. The enemy then came out of cover & engaged the British assault from the rear. Meinertzhagen ridicules this with his trademark arrogance, but as the 61st Pioneers advanced in the rear of the Force, one of their double-companies had to clear a German Maxim from the European Cemetery, which is well east of the drainage ditch. In the advance through plantation & bush, with gaps appearing in the line, it is quite possible that well-concealed & courageous German soldiers could have been passed over. The first wall panel commemorating the dead of the 61st King George's Own Pioneers. (The second panel was shown in Post #247.)
On mobilisation in India this unit had been brought up to strength by the recall of 91 Reservists & by a draft of 50 men from the 81st Pioneers.
Post #248 shows the panel commemorating the dead of the 81st Pioneers.
The Indian Army Pioneer Regiments were regarded as Infantry but with a Pioneer specialisation, & they were trained for road making & repairing, & trench construction.
The 61st Pioneers had arrived off Tanga with two Machine Guns & 38 Mules, but the mules were not disembarked.Another view towards the north end of the Tanga drainage ditch. The German hospital is to the left rear & the road bridge over the cutting is to the right rear.
Orders fom the British Command now seem to have dried up, as senior officers from the Loyal North Lancashires took over the positioning of a defence line. The Bn 2IC Major W.D. Sanderson organised this, the whole operation taking about two hours.
The right of the line was on the railway cutting & was manned by Kashmiris, 61st Pioneers, Rajputs & some Loyal North Lancashires.
The left of the line ran back southeastwards to near the Cemetery, where it was echeloned with one company in the rear, to give protection from the south. This critical part of the defence was manned by the bulk of the Loyal North Lancashires
The line was strengthened where it left the cutting by the two Machine Guns of the 61st Pioneers & one from the Rajputs. Also a gun left by the Palamcottahs went into action here, manned by two Loyal North Lancashires. (Privates Boyle & Arnull of A Company were both to receive DCMs for this work.)
These guns fired very effectively & provided the fire support that the Loyal North Lancashires main body now needed.
Another new Feldkompagnie had arrived & Lettow was planning his next attack.Location of the final German counter attack at Tanga on 04 November 1914. The railway cutting is to our left & the European Cemetery to our right. The Loyal North Lancashires, now assisted by some of the 98th Infantry, were digging-in on the far side of the sports field, facing this way. This image is looking in the direction of the German attack.
Whilst the British troops prepared their new defensive line they were not left undisturbed. The Loyal North Lancashires' War Diary comments: "The enemy made several counter-attacks about this time, sounding bugles to rally & to charge & opening rifle fire & Maxim fire at decisive range."
The British were intrigued by the German use of the bugle. It gave away positions in the bush but it was the fastest way of passing orders.
On the north of the line L/Cpl Wylde, Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, was winning a DCM: "as having of his own accord, near the bridge about 4.00 pm, under heavy fire, collected numbers of soldiers, Indian & others, in a very cool manner. On several occasions rallying them & putting them in position on the right (north) of the road & checking the German counter attack on that side."
The resolve of the British Command may have been crumbling but the professionalism of the British Regular Army troops was not.
4 Feldkompagnie had arrived from Moshi & at about 5.30 pm Lettow launched it into another counter-attack on the British south flank.
4 FK should have attacked east of the route taken by 13 FK when that unit hit the 101st Grenadiers, but in the confusion of the battlefield 4 FK cut inside & ran straight across the fire of the bulk of the Loyal North Lancashires' positions.
The British Machine Guns had a good shoot across the battlefield & 4 FK's attack was decisively broken. In this sharp fighting Lt Cyril Dickson, now commanding No 4 Company, was killed in action.
The Loyal North Lancashires expected to remain in this position for the night & improved the defences. The wall panel commemorating the dead of the 98th Infantry, 99th Deccan Infantry & of the 3rd Gwalior Rifles.
It's possible that a draft from the 99th Deccan Infantry had brought the 98th Infantry up to strength before embarkation.
Although the 98th declined to be involved in much of the fighting on 04 November 1914, only one company left the battlefield. The companies who remained took casualties.
The 3rd Gwalior Rifles were an Imperial Service unit maintained by the Maharajah of Gwalior. Gwalior is located in central India. A half-Bn landed at Tanga. Three Companies guarded the beaches & the fourth was part of the Composite Bn along with the half-Bn of 3rd Kashmir Rifles. The Gwaliors were unlikely to have been as effective as the more martial Kashmiris who were recruited from the Himalayan foothills.An old villa on the cliff on the east of Ras Kasone. Although a few hundred metres north of "A" Beach, this villa is probably similar to the Red House which was located above "A" Beach.
The British Field Ambulance established itself here, & a British officer who landed on "A" Beach commented: "The medical arrangements were most primitive since no lighter or boat was allotted to the equipment of the Field Ambulance; 3 or 4 Medical Officers with only such equipment as they could carry set up a dressing station of sorts in the Red House where operations without anaesthetic were carried out on the kitchen table."
British casualties treated in the German Hospital enjoyed better facilities.
Throughout the landings some lighters were cast off too far from shore by the Royal Navy launches. If the water was too deep for the men to wade ashore they just had to wait until another launch would take them in further. This led to slowness & confusion, & the drinking of water intended for battlefield consumption.
The three small beaches were overcrowded with civilian African porters & Indian labourers, terrified by the sound of constant Machine Gun fire & the sights of casualties returning & of some men running in fear. The British rear echelon officers, probably unused to dealing with the stresses & shocks of the battlefield, appear to have let this confusion & babble affect their judgements, & some began to believe that all the Indian troops had broken & that the British Force was doomed. Down in the railway cutting.
In the line the British troops were not considering defeat. Amongst their own ranks the men had been sorted from the boys, & the breaking of 4 Feldkompagnie's counter attack had been satisfying.
Loyal North Lancashire soldiers now scoured the battlefield for abandoned Machine Guns & brought them into use in the line. Privates J. Cunningham, R. Woodward & T. Smith, all of E Company, were later awarded DCMs for this work.
The German troops, exhausted by being flung into battle immediately after the four-mile forced march from Kange Station (up the Usambara line from Tanga), were unsettled by the failure of 4 FK's attack & the losses suffered. They believed that the British had superiority on the battlefield.
The German commander on the south flank ordered his bugler to sound the call to retire. The bugler sounded "Return to Camp" & this was taken up by buglers all down the line. All German units now thankfully marched back to Kange Station - much to Lettow's dismay when he saw it happening.
Tanga town was empty, as it had been the night before, but once again the GSO 3 (Int) didn't implement a Force Patrol Programme (although he claims to have been out patrolling himself).
At this stage it apears that on the British side the 63rd Palamcottah Light Infantry, the 98th Infantry, half the 13th Rajputs & the Gwalior half-Bn were non-effective.
The 101st Grenadiers were severely reduced in capability, & honourably so, but could have been employed on rear area security duties.
However the Loyal North Lancashires, 2nd Kashmiris, the half-Bn of 3rd Kashmiris, half the 13th Rajputs & the bulk of the 61st Pioneers were ready for another fight. If the guns of the Mountain Battery had been landed & if the naval guns of HMS "Fox" had fired on the German approaches & concentration areas, success would not have been far away.
But Fortune Favours the Bold.
Lettow displayed bold leadership & strength of character by turning round his troops at Kange & marching them straight back into Tanga.
In the White House shocked British senior officers, unused to witnessing both the realities & the ebb & flow of battle, argued against another British attack. Defeatism crept into the British Command.All the troops in the line needed water, but none was immediately available near the line.
This was a simple echelon replenishment task but replenishment was not performed. This tells us something about the confused situation in the Echelon areas at the beaches, & of course about the difficulties of fresh water replenishment when landing on a hostile coastline.
Men with vigour & ruthless energy were now needed to restore confidence on the beaches & to the resupply situation, but such men were uncommon in Indian Expeditionary Force "B". The best of the Indian Army had competed for places amongst the 44,000 men sent to France on 25th August 1914. Prior to that the first elements of Indian Expeditionary Force "C" had sailed for BEA on 19 August to defend the Uganda Railway. (IEF "C" was: 29th Punjabis; two Imperial Service Bns made up from four half-Bns from the princely states of: Bhurtpore, Jind, Kapurthala, & Rampur; 27th Mountain Battery; a field battery of Calcutta Volunteer Artillery; & a Machine Gun Battery of the Railway Volunteers.) The Government of India had also started sending the 6th Division to Basra, & six Infantry Brigades & one Cavalry Brigade to Egypt. Hong Kong & Aden also wanted Indian troops.
Indian Expeditionary Force "B" had been allocated troops & staff officers, but not as a high priority. Many of the best had gone elsewhere.
In the end the easiest answer was adopted by the staff - the fighting troops were ordered to move to the nearest water supply which was at the German Hospital.
The north of the line pulled back from the railway cutting & at around 6.00 pm the Loyal North Lancashires moved back in Company groups to the Hospital.
The Germans did not interfere - they were doubtless receiving a severe pep-talk from Lettow in the vicinity of Kange.
After digging-in at the German Hospital, at 10.00 pm all troops were ordered back to the beach areas. The British Command had thrown the towel in & decided to withdraw by sea.
The Loyal North Lancashires worked on improving their original first trench line until about 2.30 am.
The 4th November 1914 had been a long & eventful day, & the troops were now back where they had started the assault from - but with gaps in the ranks of all units. The northeast tip of Ras Kasone, with monsoon clouds above.
This was the season of the Short Rains. The Loyal North Lancashires had been drenched whilst landing & now another monsoon deluge descended, filling the trenches at stand-to on 05 November 1914.
Because it could not be observed from Tanga town, "A" Beach was selected for the withdrawal. The 61st Pioneers constructed ramps down the cliffs. The British Force had to wait until after noon for suitable tides to float lighters over the reefs.
Around 130 of the most seriously wounded men, along with five Medical Officers, were concentrated at the Red House for surrendering once the Force had withdrawn.
The staff now ordered that equipment heavier than a rifle be abandoned in order to protect the boats from damage (despite the fact that the same boats had landed these items). Machine Guns, all small arms ammunition, signals, pioneer & cooking equipment were to be left behind. Orders for the destruction of these items were not issued.
The fighting troops were dismayed, & confidence in the British Command fell further. Not all units obeyed this order. The Adjutant of the Loyal North Lancashires took a party out sea-dumping ammunition.
Fortunately Lettow & his troops were busy preparing Tanga for the expected next British assault, & they left Ras Kasone alone. However two old German C73 field guns had arrived down the Usambara Railway, & they were brought into town to shell British ships. One British troopship was hit & caught fire & left the harbour.
HMS "Fox" was then sniped at, & the ship's crew returned the rifle fire. (This was perhaps one of the most useful things the "Fox" achieved during the entire battle, as she absorbed the attention of the Schutztruppe at a critical moment.) HMS "Fox" then used her guns to silence the German artillery. Shipping in Tanga Harbour
The Loyal North Lancashires & the 2nd Kashmiris held the line whilst the Force withdrew. The Kashmiris were timetabled to leave just before the Loyal North Lancashires.
The Loyal North Lancashires, who had landed with two Machine Guns, now had nine guns in the line.
Around 1.30 pm a contact with an enemy patrol led to firing occurring right along the line. The Bn War Diary comments: "Our Maxims opened fire. The enemy had fired & it is probable that some shots fell on the beach near where the troops were embarking. A loud uproar was heard on the beach which might have been heard a long way off."
As the Kashmiris left the line, the staff ordered them to double-march, despite the protestations of the 2LNL CO who knew what the likely result would be. Two Companies of the Loyal North Lancashires were unsettled by the rapid movement of the Kashmiris, but Regular Army discipline was satisfactorily applied. (RSM Owen Almond was commissioned into the Bn immediately after the battle.)
Seven Machine Guns were now disabled, the locks & spare barrels being taken onboard. The two other guns were removed complete minus their tripods & carried onboard (where a senior Indian Army officer used the privilege of his rank to take one of them off the Bn Adjutant).
The Bn had made a clean break from the line & was off-shore by 4.00 pm.
Indian Expeditionary Force "B" had withdrawn from German East Africa. The British vessels stayed off Tanga on 06 November 1914 whilst talks were held with the Germans that led to the removal of less-seriously wounded British personnel from the German Hospital & onto ships. These men were paroled - they gave their word not to fight against Germany again.
It was only then that Lettow realised that he had won & that the British were leaving.
But now the worst aspect of the Battle started - the denigration of others by some British officers. The senior British officers present were from the Indian & British Regular Armies & they had careers & future pensions to enlarge, & some of them had their own reputations to save.
Unfounded comment & rumour became gossip & common knowledge. Distortions & untruths entered the after-action reports, sometimes deliberately. The GSO 3 (Int)'s later "Army Diaries", now being exposed as sometimes massively distorted, fueled the fire of unfair criticism & even influenced the writer of the Official History.
The GOC paid a personal price for his failure, but sadly the other big loser was the reputation of the Indian Army, & whilst several severe criticisms were certainly due, it became easy to blame everything onto the Indian troops as a whole. All of this went too far, & the Tanga defeat overshadowed the importance of the role played by many more fine Indian units during the remainder of the East African Campaign.
Thankfully the dead soldiers commemorated in the Cemetery shown above knew nothing of this. Sierrahun aka 92.249-es vita 2009. szeptember 30., 14:37 (CEST)