„Fogolydilemma” változatai közötti eltérés

In [[addiction]] research/[[behavioral economics]], [[George Ainslie]] points out<ref>{{cite book |author=George Ainslie |title=Breakdown of Will |year=2001 |isbn=0-521-59694-7}}</ref> that addiction can be cast as an intertemporal PD problem between the present and future selves of the addict. In this case, ''defecting'' means ''relapsing'', and it easy to see that not defecting both today and in the future is by far the best outcome, and that defecting both today and in the future is the worst outcome. The case where one abstains today but relapses in the future is clearly a bad outcome—in some sense the discipline and self-sacrifice involved in abstaining today have been "wasted" because the future relapse means that the addict is right back where he started and will have to start over (which is quite demoralizing, and makes starting over more difficult). The final case, where one engages in the addictive behavior today while abstaining "tomorrow" will be familiar to anyone who has struggled with an addiction. The problem here is that (as in other PDs), there is an obvious benefit to defecting "today", but tomorrow one will face the same PD, and the same obvious benefit will be present then, ultimately leading to an endless string of defections.

 

 

In [[sociology]] or [[criminology]], the PD may be applied to an actual dilemma facing two inmates. The game theorist Marek Kaminski, a former political prisoner, analysed the factors contributing to payoffs in the game set up by a prosecutor for arrested defendants (see [[#References|references]] below). He concluded that while the PD is the ideal game of a prosecutor, numerous factors may strongly affect the payoffs and potentially change the properties of the game.

 

 

 

===In economics===